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8
Duties of Preservation
DONALD H. REGAN

I . THE PROBLEM
The central philosophical problem concerning our duties with regard to
nature is this : We are strongly inclined to think we have certain duties
which are not fully accounted for by instrumental arguments. We are
also strongly inclined to hold a view about value that seems to make it
impossible to account for these duties by any noninstrumental arguments.
Hence our perplexity.
It seems that we have duties to respect living creatures; to avoid causing
the extinction of species; even to preserve complex parts of the environ
ment s uch as a tropical rain forest or the Grand Canyon. If we ask how
we can account for these duties (which for convenience I shall refer to
collectively as duties of preservation), one possibility is to list the benefits
that accrue to us from acknowledging them. There are powerful instru
mental arguments for preserving tropical rain forests, which are central
to the whole planetary ecology. There are colorable arguments for the
general preservation of species, since currently obscure species can turn
out to yield new drugs or new genetic material for agricultural exploi
tation. There are more sophisticated arguments of potentially unlimited
application based on "aesthetic utility"-we should preserve particular
natural features or particular species because they embody q ualities we
value or because we find them pleasing. Instrumental arguments like these
are numerous, varied, and significant, but they do not satisfy us entirely.
They entail the consequence that if a species is not ecologically essential,
and if it will produce no wonder drug or wonder crop, then whether we
have a duty to preserve it depends on whether we like it. The content of
our duties of preservation will depend heavily on accidental features of
human preferences. This seems wrong. Analogously, even in the case of
the tropical rain forest, whose present "economic" utility is not in doubt,
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it seems wrong to claim we should preserve it merely because it is essential
to our carrying on our lives and pursuing our goals and satisfactions,
whatever they may be. The day may come when we can abandon this
planet and dispense with the rain forest. We do not believe, however,
that on that day it will become a matter of moral indifference whether
we destroy the forest. Our duties of preservation demand a more solid
foundation than our own changeable needs and fancies.
On the other hand, suppose we try to account for duties of preservation
without such instrumental arguments. It seems we must claim the natural
world is valuable in itself. Unfortunately, that claim conflicts with another
common intuition, that the existence of value depends somehow on the
existence of fairly sophisticated consciousness. If we imagine a universe
in which there is no life form higher than the nematode, and if we ask
whether it is better for that universe to exist than for there to be nothing
at all, many of us would be inclined to say that it is not better-between
the existence and the nonexistence of such a universe, there is nothing
to choose.1 I do not say at this point that the existence of value depends
on the existence of human beings. If value depends somehow on con
sciousness, then it remains to be determined what level and type of
consciousness is required and whether we are the only creatures that
possess it. But these questions are not crucial here. Our duties of pres
ervation seem to extend to natural entities that plainly do not have
conscious lives of their own of any sophistication-the nematode, the
lousewort, the Grand Canyon. It is hard to see how we can explain the
duties of preservation in a noninstrumental fashion without claiming
these entities are valuable in themselves and thereby contradicting the
intuition that value and consciousness go together.2
I I . ON N OT A V O I D IN G THE PROBLEM
The problem, then, is to give a noninstrumental account of our duties
of preservation without denying the connection between value and con
sciousness. We could, of course, avoid the problem without solving it.
We could deny the supposed duties of preservation, or we could grant
intrinsic value to entities which lack consciousness. I propose to solve
the problem, not avoid it. However, my solution may seem so implausible
as to suggest that one of the courses of avoidance must be preferable. I
therefore want to say something against each of the courses of avoidance.
It will make for the smoothest exposition (even though it will upset the
symmetry of the presentation) if I say a bit more now about the connection
between value and consciousness and put off until much later my reasons
for not simply denying duties of preservation.
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With regard to value and consciousness, I propose to look briefly at
three standard attempts to explain duties of preservation and to show
that while none of them is satisfactory, each of them achieves what
p lausibility it has by arguing in a way which tends to impute conscious
ness where it does not exist. The lesson is that hardly anyone is willing
to face the claim that value depends on consciousness and deny it outright.
(1) It is often said that a variety of nonhuman entities-animals, plants,
rivers, the " biotic community"-have rights. That such claims should be
made was inevitable; "rights" have become the philosophers' stone of
modern moral discourse. Unfortunately, we have no satisfactory under
standing of what we mean even by claims that humans, the paradigmatic
right-holders, have rights. It is this basic lack of clear understanding that
encourages claims about nonhuman rights.
It often seems that claims about Jones's rights are merely disguised
claims about other people's duties regarding Jones.3 If talk a bout rights
is merely disguised talk about duties, then rights cannot be the basis for
duties. This is as true of duties regarding nature as of duties regarding
humans. On the other hand, if we try to find a notion of rights that has
enough substance to be a genuine basis for duties, we are driven to
thinking about rights as protections of some sort for the activities of
rational, moral agents. It is clear that few or no nonhuman entities have
rights of this sort.
What I have said makes it clear that talk of nonhuman rights serves
no useful purpose, except perhaps in rare cases. Such talk survives because
our fuzzy-mindedness about the nature of rights allows assertions a bout
rights to seem significant when they are not, when they are mere covers
for assertions about duties. The seeming significance depends on the
s uggestion, easily recognized as false in the case of almost all nonhumans
once it is made explicit, that the supposed right-holder is a rational,
moral agent.
(2) It is often said that we have duties to every living creature because
every living creature has "a good of its own."4 This argument does noth
ing to explain any duties we might have to inanimate nature. Beyond
that, the argument gets a good deal of its apparent force by inviting
confusion.
Consider an oak tree. If someone who says that an oak tree has a good
of its own is pressed to j ustify that claim, he will usually respond by
pointing out that an oak tree is a complicated, self-regulating, self-sus
taining system. Now, if that is what it means to say that an oak tree has
a good of its own, I agree that an oak tree does have a good of its own.
But why does it follow that I have any moral duty regarding the oak
tree? The claim must be that, other things being equal, I should not
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interfere with complicated, self-regulating, self-sustaining systems. As it
happens, I think this claim has some plausibility, for reasons that will
become clear further on. Even so, this claim is no place to end the
argument for duties regarding nature. It is at most a suggestive place to
begin.
The real problem with saying that an oak tree has "a good of its own"
is that it leads us almost inevitably to think of the oak tree as engaged
in conscious valuation and in conscious striving after the "good" it has
chosen or acknowledged. Hardly anyone would make such claims about
the oak tree outright. But there are considerable illicit benefits (from the
point of view of one trying to j ustify duties regarding the oak tree) from
having these ideas in the air. Thinking of the oak tree as a valuer helps
us over our worry about how there can be value in nature considered
totally apart from human beings (or rational consciousness) . We can
concede that the existence of value requires a valuer, but we can let the
oak tree fill that role. The idea is that each living thing creates the value
in its own life by valuing it. Also, we readily think we should not try to
impose our views of the good on other people; each person has a right
to "a good of his own" which others should respect. If so, and if an oak
tree has a good of its own, then it seems we should respect that too.
These benefits are, as I said, illicit. The oak does not engage in conscious
valuation. If we think it important that an oak tree is a complicated, self
regulating, self-sustaining system, let us say that about the oak tree and
then argue about why it matters. Let us avoid specious shortcuts. (What
I have said in this section applies mutatis mutandis to claims that every
living creature has "interests," or that every living creature is a center of
a respect-demanding "will.")
(3) It is often said that we are members of a "global community" which
includes, in addition to ourselves, all other living creatures from chim
panzees to blue-green algae, and it is said that we have duties to the other
members of this community j ust as each of us has duties to other members
of the human community.5 However, "community"-in the only sense
in which it can possibly have any moral significance-requires at least
the potential for shared beliefs and values. The universe of living creatures
simply does not amount to a community in any morally relevant sense.
The "global community" usually turns out to be a metaphor for the
fact that all life is part of a complex ecological web. We are dependent
on many other species; and almost every other species (perhaps a bsolutely
every other species) is dependent on us in the sense that we could destroy
it if we tried. What follows from these facts ? Nothing of interest. Our
power to affect other species may be a necessary condition for our having
duties regarding them; but the mere fact of our having this power does
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not tell us what duties we have, if any, in the use of it. Similarly, our
dependence on other species means that if we do too much damage to
other living things we are likely to end up hurting ourselves as well; but
any argument from this premise will make our duties regarding nature
instrumental, which is just what the argument from global community
was meant to avoid.
Ill. THE S O LUT I ON
It is time now to introduce my own solution to the problem of j ustifying
noninstrumental duties of preservation without denying the connection
between value and consciousness. I shall borrow an idea from G. E.
Moore. The idea is best introduced by considering a specific example.
There is a natural "object" which is the Grand Canyon. Many people
know of the existence of the Grand Canyon and have some specific
knowledge of it. Consider a person Jones, who has some knowledge of
the Grand Canyon and who also takes pleasure in that knowledge.
Moore's idea is that we should regard as intrinsica lly valuable the com
plex consisting of the Grand Canyon, plus Jones's knowledge of the
Grand Canyon, plus Jones's pleasure in her knowledge of it.
It must be emphasized that what is valuable here comprises three
things-the Grand Canyon, Jones's knowledge, and Jones's pleasure in
her knowledge of the Canyon-when they occur together. The valuable
entity is what Moore called an "organic unity." The claim that this unity
is valuable does not, at least on the face of it, entail that any individual
element is valuable on its own. In particular, it does not entail either that
the Canyon is valuable on its own or that Jones's pleasure is valuable
on its own.6
The phrase "Jones's pleasure in her knowledge of the Canyon," which
I have used to describe one element of the valuable complex, may be
misleading. It suggests that Jones's pleasure is in her knowledge alone,
and not in the Canyon. It suggests that Jones is glad to know about the
Canyon, given that it is there, because she likes knowing about what is
there, but that she is otherwise indifferent to the existence of the Canyon.
That is not the state of mind I want Jones to have. I want Jones to take
pleasure in the existence of the Canyon itself. Why, then, do I not use
the phrase "Jones's pleasure in the existence of the Canyon" ? Because
that also may be misleading. This latest phrase suggests that, so long as
Jones knows there is a Grand Canyon, and is glad of that, it does not
matter whether Jones knows or cares to know anything more about the
Canyon. On my view, however, Jones ought to want to know as much
about the Canyon as possible; and she ought to take greater pleasure in
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knowing it more completely; and the more she knows the more valuable
is the complex under discussion. Perhaps, then, we should speak of
"Jones's pleasure in the existence of the Canyon and in her knowledge
of it." This is an improvement, but it still could be taken to refer to two
separable pleasures in two separate things, the Canyon, and Jones's
knowledge of it. The misleading suggestions of the previous inadequate
phrasings are not suppressed entirely. Perhaps the best description of
Jones's state of mind would be "Jones's pleasure in the Canyon as known
to her." The only trouble with this is that it sounds rather artificial. We
would hardly know what it meant if it did not come at the end of a
paragraph of hair-splitting. Hereafter I shall use all the phrases I have
discussed indiscriminately. I shall always mean by them what I would
mean by "Jones's pleasure in the Canyon as known to her"-that is, a
pleasure in the Canyon and in Jones's knowledge of it as an inseparable
whole, and a pleasure which would be magnified by greater knowledge.
So far I have described one thing, a complex involving the Grand
Can yon and Jones, which I have claimed is intrinsically valuable. Shortly
I shall give a recipe for constructing enormous numbers of valuable
complexes along the same lines. First, however, let me say a bit about
what it means to call something "intrinsically valuable."
To say something is intrinsically valuab le is to say that it is good in
itself, abstracting from its causal antecedents or consequences, and ab
stracting from its relationships to other things. It is good just for what
it is. A universe which contains it is the better for containing it (still
abstracting from causes, consequences, and external relationships) .
If something is intrinsically valuable, then any moral agent has a moral
reason to try to bring it into existence or to preserve it if it exists already.

Of course, to say a moral agent "has a moral reason" to promote the
existence of something is not to specify the strength of that reason; and
it is not to say that the agent has a conclusive moral reason. Two things
may both be intrinsically valuable, and yet one may be more valuable
than the other. If we must choose between the existence of two valuable
things, of different value, we have "a reason" to promote the existence
of each, but we have the stronger reason, and thus the conclusive reason,
other things being equal, to prefer the existence of the more valuable.
Similarly, something may be intrinsically valuable and also be instru
mentally valuable or instrumentally disvaluable. (Of course, this instru
mental value or disvalue must ultimately depend on the intrinsic value
or disvalue of something else. ) We may have a conclusive reason, all
things considered, to avoid creating or even to destroy some complex of
great intrinsic value, if its existence has sufficiently bad consequences.
All of this is elementary; but people sometimes assume that if a thing
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has intrinsic value it must have "absolute value" (either infinite value or
value that for some other reason cannot be weighed against competing
values) , or else they assume that if a thing has intrinsic value it cannot
have instrumental value or disvalue as well. These are misconceptions.
How does one go about showing that something has intrinsic value?
One does it in exactly the same way one demonstrates any other fun
damental moral proposition, however that is. I do not claim to know
how that is. I do claim that the widespread belief that propositions about
the good are harder to demonstrate than propositions about rights and
duties is the merest prejudice. For the present what we can do is to expose
and avoid outright confusions; to consult our moral intuitions; and to
see which intuitions (at all levels of particularity or generality) figure in
the most coherent moral theory we can come up with.
Very well, what other complexes, constructed on the model of the
Grand Canyon-Jones complex, are intrinsically valuable ? Clearly, if we
replace Jones by any other human being, the resulting complex will still
be valuable if the original one is. Indeed, if we replace Jones by any other
conscious agent capable of having the same sort of knowledge of the
Canyon and taking the same sort of pleasure in it as Jones does, the
resulting complex will still be valuable. The interesting question is what
we can put in the place of the Grand Canyon. I do not suggest that we
can put in the place of the Grand Canyon anything at all which we can
refer to with a definite description. I would not, for example, claim that
the complex consisting of Smith's cruelty, plus Jones's knowledge of
Smith's cruelty, plus Jones's pleasure in her knowledge of Smith's cruelty,
is intrinsically valuable.
On the other hand, I suggest that we can put in the place of the Grand
Canyon any "natural object." "Object" here is to be construed broadly,
as including anything we can refer to with a definite description. Thus,
natural objects include individual creatures, species, individual ecosys
tems, types of ecosystems, geological formations, and natural processes
(everything from " the way prokaryotes exchange energy with their en
vironment" to "the way continents have been created and destroyed by
plate tectonics"). Pions and muons are natural objects, and so is the
process of heavy-element formation in stars. In saying that all these things
are natural objects, I do not mean to be making any controversial meta
physical claim. I am saying only that every one of these things can be
part of an intrinsically valuable complex if it is conjoined with some
human being's knowledge of it and that human being's pleasure in her
knowledge. (I shall speak for now as if the only relevant knowers are
human beings.)
With Moore's idea, as I have elaborated it, in hand, we have the
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materials for an argument for the preservation of any natural object. Any
natural obj ect can be part of a valuable complex if we know the object
and take pleasure in our knowledge. As to any such complex, we have
a reason to promote its existence. If the existence of the object is essential
to the existence of the complex, then we have a reason to promote the
existence of the object. So we have a reason to preserve any natural obj ect
that currently exists.
Now, consider some particular natural obj ect. Someone might say:
"Unless we know the object and take pleasure in our knowledge, the
obj ect's mere existence is not valuable. Therefore our having a reason to
preserve the object depends on our knowing it and taking pleasure in it.
We have no reason to preserve an object we do not know, or that we
take no pleasure in. So what we should preserve depends on what we
like, and we are back where we started." This is not correct. It is true
that if our ignorance of the obj ect, or our lack of pleasure in it, were an
immutable feature of the universe, then we would have no reason to
preserve the object in question. But we are capable of learning about the
object; and I believe we are capable of learning to take pleasure in knowl
edge of any natural obj ect. If that is so, then we have reason to preserve
any natural object, j ust as I said. With regard to obj ects we already know
about and take pleasure in, it is enough to preserve them. With regard
to obj ects we do not know or take pleasure in, we have reason to preserve
them, and to study them, and to learn to enjoy our knowledge of them.
(Even as to objects we already know something about and enjoy knowing
about, there is probably a lways more we might know. If, as I assume,
fuller knowledge makes a more valuable complex, then we have reason
to study these objects as well.)
Observe what my argument, if we can accept it, accomplishes. It gives
us a noninstrumental argument for the preservation of natural obj ects,
without denying the intuition that the existence of value depends some
how on consciousness. Both of these points bear spelling out.
I V . ON NoN I NSTRUMENTALITY
The main thing I mean when I say the present argument is "noninstru
mental" is this: On the present argument it is not the case that we have
reason to preserve a natural object only if it is economically useful or if
we happen to like it. We have reason to preserve every natural obj ect;
those we do not currently have knowledge of or take pleasure in, we
ought to learn about and learn to take pleasure in. It is true that our
having reason to preserve every natural object depends on the fact that
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we have at least the potential for knowing about and taking pleasure in
it. But that is a potential we have and which, on the present argument,
we ought to develop. The argument for preservation does not disappear
just because we decide to ignore that potential. Nor is it n ecessarily
overridden if it turris out that we could satisfy more of our preferences
overall by ignoring that potential. Satisfying our preferences is not all
that morality is about. The central objection to traditional instrumental
arguments for preservation is that they make the case for preservation
depend on accidental or arbitrary facts about our needs and preferences.
The present argument depends on only one deep fact about us, which,
while it could be otherwise, seems too fundamental to be regarded as
accidental or arbitrary. The fact that we are able to take p leasure in the
knowledge of any natural object is not at all similar to the fact that most
of us like butterflies and do not like slugs.
The present argument is also noninstrumental in the sense that it does
not make preservation a means to maximizing "the good for man." The
good to be maximized is one in which human beings figure essentially
(assuming we are the only sufficiently sophisticated consciousnesses in
the universe) . The good complexes I have described cannot exist without
certain facts being true of certain humans. But these complexes are not
good because they are "good for" the humans involved.
It might seem that my argument is instrumental in the sense that the
existence of any natural object is valuable only because it is necessary to
something else, namely, the existence of various complexes of the sort I
have described. This suggestion rests on a confusion about the nature of
instrumental value. It is true that the existence of a natural object is
valuable only as part of one of my complexes. But that is not to say that
its value is merely instrumental. Its value does not lie in its consequences;
it is not valuable because it causes something else. The complex which
is valuable is different from the obj ect alone; but the obj ect is an essential
part of it. The relationship between the obj ect and what is valuable in
itself is a logical relationship, and not a merely causal one. (I should
perhaps point out that the object may have instrumental value, even with
respect to a complex in which it figures. The object must exist before it
can be known. Its existence at one time may have as a causal consequence
its existing and being known at a later time. So its existence at the earlier
time may be instrumental to the existence of the valuable complex at the
later time. It remains true that the value of the object is not merely
instrumental, since the object figures essentially in the valuable complex
realized at the later time.)
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v. O N VA LUE AND C O NSCI OUSNESS
I have spelled out the point that my argument for preservation is not
instrumental. Let me say a word about the point that it is consistent with
our intuition about the relation between value and consciousness. Some
one who says that the existence -0f value depends on consciousness may
mean two quite different things. He may mean, " No proposition about
value is true except in virtue of b eing believed by some conscious being."
Alternatively, he may mean, " Nothing has positive or negative value
unless it somehow involves consciousness." The first claim is metaethical:
it is about truth-conditions for moral claims, and it entails subj ectivism
of some sort. The s econd claim is normative: it is about what sort of
thing in fact has value, and it is consistent with obj ectivism. The simplest
way to see the difference between these claims may be to imagine a
universe devoid of consciousness. The proponent of the first claim might
well say about that universe that it has "no value" in th e sense that no
attribution to it of any particular degree of value is true. Because th e
universe is devoid of consciousness, the question of its value simply
cannot arise. (The proponent of the first claim need not say this, but it
is something he could say.) The proponent of the second claim, in con
trast, would say that the universe without consciousness has a quite
definite value, namely zero.
The claim I am presently interested in is the second, normative, claim.
It is the second claim that, in the opening paragraphs of this essay, seemed
to stand in the way of explaining our duties of preservation by nonin
strumental arguments. But it is clear that my Moorean argument for
preservation is perfectly consistent with the intuition that nothing has
value unless it somehow involves consciousness. The only things that I
have asserted are valuable do involve consciousness. The consistency of
my view with th e claim that value requires consciousness is obvious, once
we are clear about what version of that claim creates the difficulty.

V I . OBJECTI O NS AND C OMPL I C ATI O NS
I have said that a natural object such as the Grand Canyon is not valuable
in itself, but that it is good for the Canyon to exist and for us to know
about it and take pleasure in our knowledge. Someone might obj ect that
this position is incoherent. How can it possibly be a good thing for us
to know about the Canyon and take pleasure in it unless the Canyon is
worth knowing about and taking pleasure in ? In short, does not my view,
that a certain sort of complex involving the Canyon is good, presuppose
that the Canyon is good in itself?7
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I concede that on my view the Canyon must be, in some sense, "worth"
knowing about and taking pleasure in. It does not follow, however, that
the Canyon must be valuable in itself. Rather, to say the Canyon is worth
knowing about is to say precisely that complexes involving the Canyon
and someone's knowledge of it and pleasure in it are good. To say this
is to assert something about the Canyon which is not tautological or
trivial. As I have already pointed out, there are things (such as "Smith's
cruelty") which do not generate good complexes when someone knows
about them and takes pleasure in them. So, the claim that the Canyon
is worth knowing about is a significant claim even though it does not
entail that the Canyon is valuable in itself.8
The hypothetical objector may not be satisfied. How do I know that
the complex involving the Grand Canyon is good and the analogous
complex involving Smith's cruelty is bad? Must not there be something
about the Grand Canyon (itself) and Smith's cruelty (itself) that accounts
for this difference? What could it be except that the Canyon is good in
itself and Smith's cruelty is bad in itself? A complete answer to this
question would take us far beyond the present essay. The short answer
is this. There is a difference between the Canyon and Smith's cruelty,
and it is a difference in intrinsic value. But the difference is that while
Smith's cruelty is bad in itself, the Canyon has zero value in itself. (Note
that Smith's cruelty can be bad in itself without violating the principle
that value requires consciousness, since Smith's cruelty is itself a feature
of a certain consciousness.) As to things, like Smith's cruelty, that are
good or bad in themselves, it is good to know them and take pleasure
in them if they are good, bad to know them and take pleasure in them
if they are bad. (It is not the knowledge but the taking pleasure that
makes the complex bad when the thing is bad in itself.) As to things, lik e
the Canyon, that are neither good nor bad in themselves, knowing them
and taking pleasure in them is good. There is an asymmetry in this
position. But that, so far as I can now make out, is the way it is.
A different objection to my claim that the Grand Canyon has no value
on its own depends on the well-known "last person" argument.9 Suppose
Jones is the last person on earth. She knows there will be no one after
her. As she dies, she can push a button which detonates a cataclysmic
explosion and destroys the Grand Canyon. Would it be wrong for her
to push the button ? Many people are inclined to think it would be wrong;
and they also think that the wrongness of pushing the button can only
b e accounted for by granting the Canyon value in itself. After all (the
argument goes), once Jones is dead, the universe is empty of conscious
n ess. If consciousness is essential to value, then there is zero value,
whether the Canyon is still there or not. If it makes no difference to the
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value of the universe whether the Canyon exists after Jones dies, she can
hardly do wrong by destroying it in the moment of her death.
My own view is that it would be wrong for Jones to destroy the Canyon,
but that we can account for this consistently with my theory. There are
two different points to be made, both of them important. First, assuming
Jones destroys the Canyon, why does she do it? We could describ e a
variety of possible motivations, which differ subtly, but there must b e a
common element of sheer wanton destructiveness. Jones wants the Can
yon not to exist. But that desire is inconsistent with Jones 's knowing of
the existence of the Canyon and taking pleasure in it. If Jones has the
proper attitude toward the Canyon (that is, the attitude which would
figure in a valuable complex involving the Canyon and herself), she will
not destroy the Canyon. Conversely, if she does destroy the Canyon, she
has the wrong attitude, and that is what is wrong in the situation. It is
true that on this analysis her act of destruction is wrong only derivatively.
The act is wrong because it manifests a wrong attitude, while the attitude
would be wrong whether the act were done or not. Still, it is the act that
manifests th e attitude to us, so it is natural that we should locate the
wrongness in the act, at least on first consideration. (Someone might ask
us to imagine that Jones does take pleasure in the existence of the Canyon,
so long as she exists, but that she is saddened by the thought of the
Canyon surviving her. She wants to affirm her intimacy with it by "taking
it with her." I do not find this psychologically plausible. If it were plau
sible, then perhaps we should say that Jones was extemely peculiar, but
in such a way as to make her apparently wrong act arguably innocent.)
My second point about the "last person" argument avoids any psy
chological claims, but raises other complications. Th e argument that it
does not matter whether the Canyon exists after Jones's death assumes
that the Canyon's existence can only be valuable as part of a complex
involving contemporaneous knowledge by some consciousness. Is it not
possible, however, that the value of the universe could be increased by
the Canyon's existence after Jones's death, combined with Jones's knowl
edge (before her death) that the Canyon will continue to exist and her
pleasure in that knowledge? When I first described the sort of complex
we have been discussing, I ignored this matter of timing, and I must admit
that it raises many questions I find perplexing. But we plainly cannot
insist on contemporaneous consciousness in every case. Consider human
knowledge of dinosaurs. No dinosaur was ever known by a contemporary
human consciousness, but it is good that dinosaurs should have existed
and that humans now should know about them and take pleasure in that
knowledge. If there is good to be achieved by knowledge of what came
before the first h uman, why not also by knowledge of what comes after
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the last one? But if there is good to be achieved by knowledge of what
comes after the last human, then Jones, in destroying the Grand Canyon,
destroys an opportunity for good.10
Now we have a new problem. I have said that our knowledge of
dinosaurs is valuable even though dinosaurs no longer exist. That might
seem to affect the nature of our obligation to preserve species that do
exist. Imagine that there is some species about which we know everything
there is to know. Is there really any reason to preserve that species? We
will not learn more about it if it continues to exist. If it ceases to exist,
we can remember it. We can continue to know "how it was" and to take
p leasure in our knowledge. What difference does it make whether the
species is still around?
Although I think it is not a matter of indifference whether the species
continues to exist, I should admit that in one respect the case for pres
ervation is weakened by our complete knowledge of the species. If we
find ourselves in circumstances where we must choose between two sim
ilar species-where both are endangered but only one can be saved-we
have reason to save the species about which we know less in order that,
after study, we may eventually end up with the greatest aggregate knowl
edge of the two species.
Going back to the case where there is just one species which we know
completely, why is it desirable that that species continue to exist? One
point, of course, is that its continued existence may b e important instru
mentally to our continuing knowledge of its past existence and pleasure
in that knowledge. This argument disappears, however, if we assume that
our memory simply will not fade. Another tempting suggestion is this:
The species cannot be completely known if it ceases to exist, since if it
continues to exist it will evolve and will have a future development that
we cannot predict. Therefore the question why it is good for a completely
known species to continue to exist cannot properly arise. This may b e
the right answer, but i t raises complications. What are the criteria for
identity of a species over time? If the species evolves, is it the same species?
If it gives rise to a different species, then the consequence of continuing
its existence past the present is not that it will continue to exist and be
known by us, but that something new will come into existence which
we can know. Our knowing that new thing would, on my view, be a
source of value; but if the present species ceases to exist for some reason
other than self-annihilation by evolution, then presumably different new
things will come into existence for us to know. It is not immediately
obvious which possible set of new things would, if known, generate
complexes of greater intrinsic value.
For the present, I am inclined to rest simply on an intuition that it is
207

Donald H. Regan

better, other things being equal, for something to exist and be known
than for it not to exist and (though nonexistent) be known. Many phi
losophers have had the intuition, in one form or another, that existence
is good. I have rej ected the claim that the mere existence of entities
without consciousness is a good. But that rejection is perfectly consistent
with the suggestion, which I would expect to be widely accepted and
which reflects the intuition that existence is better than nonexistence,
that existing-and-being-known is better than non-existing-and- (nonethe
less)-being-known.
We should also remember that the question "What difference does it
make whether the perfectly known species continues to exist?" will arise
in some context. Insofar as we are called upon to make a choice, our
choice can be expected to manifest our attitude toward th e species, j ust
as Jones 's choice about the Grand Canyon manifested her attitude. If we
now take pleasure in our knowledge of the species, we will not be able
to regard it as a matter of indifference whether the species continues to
exist. We may decline to save it, or we may even eliminate it, for adequate
cause. But we will not let it go or eliminate it for no reason at all.
V I I . S OME APP L I CATIONS
So far I have been engaged in general exposition of my theory. It may
clarify how the theory works if we look at some examples.
(1) Consider a case where we must choose between protecting two
individuals of some common species and protecting the last two (mating)
individuals of a similar but rare species. Most of us would think it better
to protect the rare individuals. Theories based on the "rights" or " in
terests " of individual living creatures cannot account for this intuition.11
My theory, however, accounts for it very simply. Which ever pair of
individuals we protect, we save two individuals (whose existence we know
of and take pleasure in) . That is good. But if we protect the rare indi
viduals, and only if we protect them, we also save a species which would
otherwise disappear. B ecause the species is a separate "natural obj ect,"
saving the species is a separate good. What I have just said may seem
too simple to be an argument. I have hardly done more than restate the
obvious basis for our intuition that we should save the rare individuals.
The point is that my theory, on which every natural obj ect is potentially
valuable, and valuable in essentially the same way though not necessarily
to the same degree, provides a natural home for our intuition. Competing
theories do not.
(2) Consider a case where we must decide whether or not to prevent
the extinction of a species which seems to be disappearing in the natural
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course of events and not b ecause of human intervention. Even people
who feel strongly that we should not cause extinctions are likely to feel
that allowing an extinction to occur (not preventing it when prevention
is in our power) is quite a different thing. This obviously cannot b e
explained b y a theory which assigns value only to species a s such. O n
my view, the difference between causing a n extinction and a llowing an
extinction is explained by the fact that natural processes are potentially
valuable natural obj ects just as species are. Where we cause an extinction,
we are destroying both the species and its natural "traj ectory." If we
prevent an extinction, we are saving a species (which is good) , but we
are interfering with a natural process. It does not follow from this that
we should always allow extinctions. There is a choice to be made. But
when the issue is whether to allow an extinction, as opposed to whether
to cause an extinction, there are considerations on both sides.
(3) A similar question is whether we should interfere in a particular
case to save an animal about to be eaten by a predator. On any theory
which confines its attention to individuals, it is hard to see why we may
not choose either way. The same is true even on a theory that values
species, if the choice we are considering arises in only a small number
of cases. However, many people would think that, barring special cir
cumstances, we probably should not intervene. This again is easily ex
plained if we grant value (by which I always mean potential value as part
of an appropriate complex) to the natural processes of predator-prey
interaction.
(4) A rather different question is whether we should preserve things
which are dangerous, such as the smallpox virus or rats, or things which
are generally thought ugly, like banana slugs. My theory says that we
have reason to preserve the smallpox virus and that the reason is of the
same type as the reason for preserving, say, butterflies. But if the con
sequential costs of preserving the smallpox virus are too great, then on
balance we should extinguish it. Calculating the consequences and strik
ing the balance may be very complicated. But the fact that the smallpox
virus is dangerous to people does not mean it is not worth knowing about
or that we may not take pleasure in knowing about it. No more does
the "sliminess" of the slug make it unworthy. "All God's creatures" are
worth our attention.
(5) Sometimes we have to destroy something, like a laboratory animal
or the natural operation of some natural process over a particular stretch
of time, in order to increase our knowledge of the thing we destroy or
of similar things. On my view, this destruction may be j ustified. The value
of our knowledge of and pleasure in anything is increased if the know!209
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edge increases. In some cases, then, the destruction, which should always
be cause for regret, will produce adequate compensating b enefits.
(6) There has been discussion of whether we should focus our efforts
at preservation on rare species or on rare ecosystems.12 There is even the
suggestion that protecting species and protecting ecosystems will come
to the same thing in practice. Although I agree with much of what is said
about this, I would point out that there is a difference in principle between
protecting species and protecting ecosystems. We can easily imagine an
ecosystem which contains only common species (and only species com
mon outside that ecosystem) but which is nonetheless special as an eco
system b ecause the species interact there in unique ways. Similarly, we
can imagine a species which is rare, and which inhabits only one eco
system, but which does not make the ecosystem as such specially inter
esting because a similar ecological role is played by a similar but more
common species in many similar ecosystems. Given that there is a dif
ference between protecting rare species and rare ecosystems, my theory
says that we should protect both. I think that comports with most people's
intuitions .
(7) Finally, what is the value of human-created species? This is an
unusual question, but a very interesting one. It seems to me that human
created species must be regarded as human artifacts. Many human ar
tifacts are valuable in the same general way as natural obj ects ; but they
are not valuable in exactly the same way. To explain why not, I must
add to my theory a point that has not been brought out previously. I
have not attempted to characterize in full detail th e emotion I have
referred to as our pleasure in the knowledge of various natural objects.
One aspect of that emotion ought to be pleasure in the knowledge of
them as natural, as things not of our making. Our relation to the natural
world is complex. We are rooted in it. We evolved out of it. But also, in
some sense, we have evolved out of it. Unless we are in some deep way
different from earthquakes, oak trees, and lemurs, moral philosophy, and
indeed all philosophy and all science, is an illusion. I do not claim to
understand j ust how we are different from earthquakes, oak trees, and
lemurs; but if there is such a gulf as I claim between the human world
and the natural world, that is itself a fact (or an enormous system of
facts) worth l earning about and taking pleasure in. It follows, I think,
that we should value what is natural in part for being natural. And so,
of course, we should value what is human in part for being human.
Everything made by humans (or at least every material thing made by
humans) has a natural component; and the proportions and mode of
mixing of the natural and the "human" may vary greatly. I do not mean
to suggest that a "wild" garden and a freeway interchange are to b e
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valued in exactly the same way because they both show the human hand.
But the distinction between what is and what is not our creation would
be crucial to a complete explication (which I cannot here provide) of
how we should enjoy the world around us.13
V I I I . PRIORITIES AMO N G S PECIES
I turn now from specific cases to some general remarks on the problem
of priorities among species. These remarks will also tend to fill out my
theory. The question is this: If we can preserve only a limited number
of endangered species, and if we have some choice about which to pre
serve, how should we decide? Specifically, what makes one species in
trinsically more valuable than another ? The second question, about in
trinsic value, is narrower than the first question, about how we should
decide. I shall focus on the second question, but I should point out what
I am ignoring, which is questions about the instrumental value and dis
value of species.14 Species often have substantial instrumental value or
disvalue. It is likely that in many cases where we must decide what to
preserve, the instrumental considerations completely swamp considera
tions relating to the intrinsic value of the species themselves. Of course,
in principle, we cannot know what the instrumental considerations are
without having a complete theory of intrinsic value. But a complete theory
would recognize many forms of intrinsic value not discussed in this essay.
So, in discussing only the intrinsic value of species, I am dealing with
only a part, perhaps a very small part, of the problem.15
It seems that there are two clear general principles. First, more complex
life forms are more valuable than less complex ones, other things b eing
equal. A ferret is more valuable than a centipede, which is more valuable
than an amoeba. Even an amoeba is enormously complex. Still, there are
degrees of complexity; and that remains true even if I am wrong about
my specific rankings. Given that there are degrees of complexity, the
more complex obj ect is more valuable just because it provides the op
portunity for more knowledge. There is more to be known about a
complex obj ect than about a simple one. (To be sure, the possibility of
the thing b eing "known" at all depends on its having a certain stable
internal organization. Complexity is not the same as chaos, and there is
a sense in which organization is simplicity. But these facts do not s eem
to upset our intuitions about the value of complexity and the reason it
is valuable.)
In the preceding paragraph I compared "a ferret" with "a centipede,"
and so on. The original question concerned the value of a species of ferret
or a species of centipede. Does the value ranking remain the same whether
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we talk about individuals or species? In general, yes. There may b e some
exceptions, however. Social insects, for example, exhibit complexities of
behavior as species that would be unknown to us and possibly undis
coverable if we knew these insects only as individuals. So in this case the
species is relatively more valuable than we might think after considering
only the (apparent) complexity of individuals . Similarly, certain species
may play special roles in complex and unusual ecosystems, which makes
a complete knowledge of them and their systematic role more valuable
than it would otherwise seem.
The second clear general principle is that, other things being equal, a
species is made more valuable by belonging to a sparsely populated genus
or family or order. Taxonomically isolated species are likely to represent
unusual modes of adaptation. Their existence increases the diversity of
nature. That means both that there is more to know about what exists,
and that a complete knowledge of what exists entails a greater knowledge
of nature's possibilities.
Needless to say, the values of complexity and diversity may conflict.
We might be compelled to choose between a complex species in a richly
populated genus and a simpler species which has no congeners at all.
A question that I shall raise without answering is whether a species
acquires special value by having a role in some human culture. Animals
figure in our cultural practices in a variety of ways. The bald eagle is the
national symbol of the United States. Certain Eskimo tribes depend heav
ily on th e bowhead whale. English-speaking children (and many adults
who were once English-speaking children) may have special feelings about
rabbits and deer because they were brought up with Peter Rabbit and
Bambi. And so on. Clearly any of these facts may invest a species with
special instrumental importance. The question is, do any of these facts
invest the species with special intrinsic importance? Or rather, since we
deny intrinsic importance to the species itself, do any of the cultural
complexes we have indicated have an intrinsic value that is not exhausted
by the value of the "natural object plus knowledge plus pleasure in the
knowledge" and in which the species figures essentially? It should be
apparent why, having raised this question, I cannot answer it h ere. An
answer would presuppose a complete theory of the intrinsic value of
cultural manifestations. We would also need to say more than we have
said about the special value (if any) of shared knowledge, as opposed to
knowledge belonging (or considered as belonging) to individual knowers
only. I suspect that in the end we would conclude that the intrinsic value
of a species is increased by its playing a special role in human culture.
But for now that must remain a conjecture.
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IX. THE IMPORTANCE OF BEI N G HUMAN
For much of this paper I have written as if the valuable complexes under
discussion must involve, in addition to some natural object, a human
being who knows the obj ect and takes pleasure in it. Is this concentration
on human knowers justified? As I have already explained, it is not my
intention to limit the relevant range of knowers by stipulation. In prin
ciple, other knowing subjects could fill the role of the human being in
the complexes I regard as valuable. It just seems to me that in the universe
as we know it, there are no other subjects who can fill the same role.
Why not? Obviously, there is both a normative and an empirical prem
ise. The normative premise specifies just what kind of knowledge and
pleasure-j ust what sort of consciousness-is necessary to the goodness
of one of my complexes. The empirical premise is that there are no other
subjects in the universe who possess the relevant sort of consciousness.
I have said the subject whose participation makes a valuable complex
must know some natural object and take pleasure in it. We cannot deny
that certain creatures besides ourselves have "knowledge" of some sort
and experience "pleasure" of some sort. But knowledge and pleasure
come in many varieties. Although I cannot define precisely the features
of consciousness that go to make a valuable complex, I can make it clear
that the consciousness must be relatively sophisticated.
First, the knowing subject must be self-conscious. He (let me call the
indefinite and possibly nonhuman subject " he") must be aware of himself
as something separate from the object of his knowledge. Why is this
important? Because the subject must take pleasure in the object and in
his knowledge of the object. The subject who does not distinguish be
tween himself and the object may feel pleasure as a result of his awareness
of the object, but it seems that he can hardly take pleasure in the object
(as such) . Even more clearly, unless he is aware of himself as a knowing
subject, he is not aware that he has knowledge, and so he cannot take
pleasure in his knowledge.
A related point is that the subject must be able to contemplate the
possibility of the nonexistence of the things he takes pleasure in. To take
pleasure in something, as opposed to merely getting pleasure from some
thing, requires that one consciously prefer the existence of what one takes
pleasure in to its nonexistence, and therefore requires that one be able
to contemplate its nonexistence.
If the full range of possible goods from knowledge of and pleasure in
natural objects is to be achieved, the knowing subject must be capable
of wide-ranging intellectual apprehension. For example, if the full range
of possible goods is to be achieved, the subject must be able to appreciate
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modern physics. This obviously requires an intellectual capacity consid
erably in excess of day-to-day needs. It also requires the ability to engage
in complicated symbolic activity.
Finally, I am inclined to think that the knowing sub ject must at least
be able to raise the question of what is intrinsically good. Whether this
is a further required feature of the relevant consciousness or whether
ability to raise value questions is entailed by the other features I have
mentioned and briefly argued for (self-consciousness, ability to contem
plate nonexistence, wide-ranging intellectual apprehension and symbolic
capacity) is itself an interesting problem. Whatever the answer to that
problem, however, the reference to ability to raise value questions sug
gests a useful way of characterizing the required features as a group.
Even if the first four features are not sufficient to guarantee the ability
to raise value questions, they seem necessary to that ability. In a sense,
then, the whole package adds up to the ability to raise value questions.
This seems eminently reasonable. Remember that what got us started on
this search was a feeling that the existence of value somehow depends
on consciousness. If that is so-if we are trying to define the sort of
consciousness which is essential to the existence of value-then it seems
fitting that the relevant consciousness should turn out to be one that can
appreciate value questions.
As to the empirical question whether humans are the only subjects in
the universe who have the relevant sort of consciousness, I do not claim
to know for certain. No one can afford to be too confident today that
he knows all there is to know about the intellectual life of chimpanzees
or porpoises. I would claim that, on our planet, human beings are cur
rently far beyond any other creatures in the development of the relevant
features and capacities. I would also claim that at most only a very few
of our fellow creatures are capable of developing intellectual lives at all
resembling ours. In sum, I think we have good empirical grounds for
regarding ourselves as special.
I do not understand any of the features of consciousness I have pointed
to well enough to know whether they should be regarded as occurring
in all degrees of development or whether they are intrinsically "lumpy."
That is, is it possible for a conscious creature to be ju st the slightest bit
self-conscious, or is self-consciousness an all-or-nothing matter? It seems
implausible to regard self-consciousness as strictly an all-or-nothing mat
ter, but there may still be some initial threshold of development below
which there can be no self-consciousness at all. In any event, to the extent
that the features of consciousness I have pointed to do come in degrees,
I would concede that different degrees of valuable consciousness may all
produce valuable complexes with, of course, different degrees of value.
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So there may be some intrinsic value in the intellectual life of a dog. It
does not follow, however, that the dog in whose life there is some intrinsic
value is as valuable as, or has the same "rights" as, a fully developed
human being. Because there is more good to be achieved by "cultivating"
the human, the human's needs and interests will tend to prevail.
So much for my argument about why, and to what extent, humans
are special. Many environmentalists seem to think that claiming to be
special can show only that we are arrogant or presumptuous. Paul Taylor
has recently attempted to show that humans should not be regarded as
special.16 Taylor's argument is aimed specifically against the claim that
we are special because we are "rational." That is not exactly my claim,
but it is close enough to make what he says of interest here. His argument
goes as follows: We cannot say humans are special j ust because they are
more rational than other animals. After all, cheetahs are faster than other
animals, and eagles see better. If humans are best at one thing, other
species are best at other things. Nor can we say that being rational is
better or more important than being fast or far-sighted. Being rational
has been adaptive for humans and is valued by humans. But cheetahs
and eagles have taken other routes and value other qualities.
This does not seem to be an argument at all against a position like
mine. It may be a useful reminder that we cannot say simply, " Rationality
is good because that's what we're good at," or "Rationality is valuable
because that's what we value." But it says nothing against the possibility
that there is some objective point of view from which rationality does
actually have an importance which speed and acute vision do not.
Indeed, Taylor himself seems committed to the existence of such an
objective point of view. He is one of those who believe that every creature
has a good of its own. He instructs us that we should respect the goods
of other creatures. But why? If the speed of the cheetah is good only
from the cheetah's point of view, as Taylor suggests rationality is good
only from our human-centered point of view, then why should we respect
it at all ? The cheetah's point of view is not ours. In telling us to respect
the goods of other species, Taylor implicitly assumes both that there is
a viewpoint "above" all the particular species-centered views and that
we can adopt that viewpoint. If this synoptic viewpoint exists and is
accessible to us, why should we not find when we adopt it that our
capacities have j ust the special importance I claim ?
My own view, of course, is that there is a synoptic viewpoint, and that
it is accessible to us, and that when we adopt it we see not only that
humans are specially important, but also why. What we see is that humans
are necessary to the full realization of the "goods" of other species. The
cheetah's speed is good, but it is not good in itself. It needs to be known
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by a subject who can know it and take pleasure in it in a sophisticated
way. The cheetah does not value his speed in the required way. We can
and should. This is the proper spelling out of the notion that every
creature has "a good of its own."
One of the most striking articulations of the claim that humans are
special comes from none other than Aldo Leopold, who is often thought
of as concerned only to deflate human pretensions and put us in our
place. In an essay inspired by a monument to the passenger pigeon,
Leopold writes:
For one species to mourn the death of another is a new thing under
the sun. The Cro-Magnon who slew the last mammoth thought only
of steaks. The sportsman who shot the last pigeon thought only of
his prowess. The sailor who clubbed the last auk thought of nothing
at all. But we, who have lost our pigeons, mourn the loss. Had the
funeral been ours, the pigeons would hardly have mourned us. In
this fact, rather than in Mr. DuPont's nylons or Mr. Vannevar Bush's
bombs, lies objective evidence of our superiority over the beasts.17

X . O N N o T A V O I D I N G THE PROB LEM, A G A I N
I a m now done with expounding my solution to the problem posed at
the beginning of this essay. The solution, depending as it does on a
Moorean view of the good, may seem implausible. Would it be better
after all just to deny that we have noninstrumental duties of preservation?
Many philosophers who write about our relationship to nature observe
that we have intuitions suggesting noninstrumental duties of preservation
and conclude immediately that some theoretical underpinning for such
duties must be found. That is not my position. One function of moral
theory is to account for our intuitions; but another function is to test
them. If we had a moral theory that was satisfactory, or even reasonably
satisfactory, in other respects, but that failed to account for our supposed
duties of preservation, then we would have strong reason for denying
those duties.
In truth, however, we have no theory which is even remotely satisfac
tory in other respects. There was a time when philosophers treated as
the central question of ethics the question, "What ought I to do with my
life ? " I think this is still the central question. But it is a question which
neither the modern utilitarian nor the modern Kantian (and every popular
theory is either a utilitarianism or a Kantianism) even attempts to answer.
The modern utilitarian takes as the good the satisfaction of people's
preferences, whatever they may be. But this theory of the good does not
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specify adequately what we should aim at in life, for the simple reason
that human preferences are not given exogenously. Any individual can
to some extent control the content of her own preferences. She cannot
revise them instantaneously by an act of will, but she can act in ways
which, over time, will create or strengthen some preferences and extin
guish or weaken others. Even more obviously, the general run of human
preferences are in large part the result of prior human decisions, by
families, societies, and polities; and present decisions by families, soci
eties, and polities affect what people's preferences will be in the future.
We are therefore inevitably confronted with the question of what our
preferences ought to be. What ought we to try to bring about that we
and others prefer? Aside from some observations about the desirability
of preferences being, so far as possible, well informed and consistent,
modern utilitarians have nothing to say about this. They cannot have
anything to say about this without going beyond the claim that the good
is the satisfaction of preferences. (Benthamite utilitarianism, with its claim
that the good is a single, homogeneous stuff called "pleasure," is not
subject to the same criticism. But there are other reasons why Benthamite
utilitarianism is implausible. One cannot believe after reading the G orgias
and the Philebus that pleasure is the good; and one cannot believe after
reading the Nicomachean Ethics that pleasure is homogeneous.)
The modern Kantian-and I use the term broadly, to include libertar
ians as well as liberals-is in no better state. His essential program is to
carve out for each agent a sphere of autonomy. This may be done (as
the libertarian does it) by purely negative constraints on how individuals
may be treated; or it may involve (as it does for most liberals) positive
prescriptions concerning such things as the distribution of resources. In
either case, nothing is said about what anyone ought to do with the
autonomy that has been secured for him.
If modern moral theory ignores the central question of morality
"What ought I to do with my life? "-then we need a new moral theory,
or at least a different theory from the currently popular utilitarianisms
and Kantianisms, for reasons which go far beyond the desire to justify
preservationist intuitions on philosophical grounds. It seems to me that
some theory of the good along the general lines of G. E. Moore's account
will be necessary to answer the question of what one ought to do with
one's life. It is a happy accident that such an account also allows us to
explain duties of preservation which are otherwise inexplicable. (It isn't
really an accident, of course. Any proper answer to the question of what
one ought to do with one's life will have to address the general problem
of man's place in the universe. )
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X I . C O N C L U D I N G REMARKS
This has been a long essay, a forest in which we have become preoccupied
with a number of individual trees. I have two concluding remarks.
The first remark is by way of summary and emphasis. The main thing
I set out to do was to construct a theory with two features. On the one
hand, the theory should generate categorical duties of preservation
duties that do not depend on instrumental arguments, and, more partic
ularly, duties that are independent of our changeable needs and prefer
ences. On the other hand, the theory should be consistent with our belief
that the existence of value depends on consciousness; the theory should
avoid ascribing intrinsic value to natural objects indiscriminately. I have
constructed such a theory. Whether I have made it plausible, or as plau
sible as the alternatives, the reader must j udge.
The second remark is not central to the present essay, but it is important
to a correct general understanding of our duties regarding nature. If my
theory is right, human beings occupy a special role in the universe. We
are essential to the realization of the most significant values, even those
involving nonhuman nature. What that means is that all the standard
instrumental arguments for preservation, if they are sufficiently general,
retain their full force on my view. "Sufficiently general" instrumental
arguments are those based on what is essential to human life and general
well-being, as opposed to what is necessary to satisfy particular, possibly
valueless, preferences. Thus, although I have been concerned to construct
a noninstrumental argument for certain conclusions, I have definitely not
attempted to displace instrumental arguments across the board. It may
well be that the most important arguments in practice are still instru
mental. That also accords with common intuitions.
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certain that Moore thought these unities contributed much more to the
overall value of the universe than did objects like the Canyon on its own

(Principia Ethica, chap. III, sec. 5 0 ) . In any event, I am not primarily inter
ested in exegesis of Moore. Although I have taken a fundamental idea from
him, and although I am indebted to him at many points, I shall develop his
idea in my own way and for my own purposes, without attempting to specify
where I am following him and where I am not.
7. Cf. Holmes Rolston III, "Values in Nature," Environmental Ethics 3 ( 1 98 1 ) :
1 1 3-28 ; Tom Regan, "The Nature and Possibility o f a n Environmental
Ethic," Environmental Ethics 3 ( 1 9 8 1 ) : 1 9-34.
8. My suggestion concerning what it means to say the Canyon is worth knowing
about parallels Moore's definition of the beautiful as "that of which the
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admiring contemplation is good in itself." Principia Ethica, chap. VI, sec.
121.
9. Richard Routley, "Is There a Need for a New, a n Environmental, Ethic ? "

Proceedings of the XVth World Congress o f Philosophy 1 ( 1 9 73 ) : 203-209.
1 0. The points in the text about the last person argument can be reformulated
in such a way as to undermine Moore's argument (against Sidgwick) for the
proposition that inanimate objects may have intrinsic value, at least insofar
as Moore suggests an argument and does not merely rely on his intuitions .
See Principia Ethica, chap. III, sec. 50. Moore may have gone over to Sidg
wick's side on this issue by the time he wrote Ethics (London: O xford
University Press, 1 9 1 2 ) , p. 1 5 3 .
1 1 . C f . Elliott Sober, this volume.
12. Cf. Terry Leitzell, this volume.
1 3 . Cf. Kenneth Simonsen, "The Value of Wildness," Environmental Ethics 3
( 1 9 8 1 ) : 259-63 ; Aldo Leopold, "Goose Music," in A Sand County A lmanac:
With Essays on Conservation from Round River (New York: Ballantine
Books, 1 970), pp. 226-33 .
1 4 . Perhaps I should also point out that I a m not backing off from the claim
that species have intrinsic value only within certain complexes. Strictly speak
ing, the question I shall discuss concerns the comparative intrinsic value of
complexes involving different species. It is much more convenient, however,
to speak of the intrinsic value of species, and for the course of the discussion
of priorities I shall do so.
1 5 . I am also ignoring the sort of question that Slobodkin discusses in his very
interesting essay. His concern, roughly, is how we should expend scarce
resources to identify endangered species. Given our considerable ignorance
about which species are in danger, this question may be much more important
in practice than mine. See Slobodkin, this volume.
1 6 . Paul Taylor, "The Ethics of Respect for Nature," Environmental Ethics 3
( 1 9 8 1 ) : 1 97-2 1 8 .
1 7. " On a Monument to the Pigeon," i n A Sand County Almanac, p . 1 1 7.
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